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Abstract 
Previous experiments on dishonest behaviour revealed that people are inclined to lie for better 
financial outcomes when the opportunity is there. Interestingly, several studies have proved that 
the extent of dishonesty is affected by the way how outcomes are framed. People seem to be 
more inclined to lie in order to avoid losing money than in order to enhance gaining money. 
The payoffs people received during these previous experiments were certain and clarified that 
cheating would directly led to increasing benefits. The master-thesis this current study is 
replicating investigated the influence of a probabilistic setting on dishonest behaviours, instead 
of a fixed and certain setting, previous experiments are built on. A die-under-cup paradigm is 
used with framing in terms of loss and gain as moderator. In the current experiment, an extra 
condition is added in where a loss condition is combined with invisibility of money, to search 
for effects the original master-thesis did not find. In general, the current study did not find any 
signs of dishonest behaviours in the gain- and initial loss-frame. These results were in line with 
the original master-thesis. In contradiction with the original master-thesis, the new loss 
condition showed dishonest behaviours in an overreport of 6’s. People were more willing to 
cheat in a loss-condition where money was not visible. Theoretical and practical contributions 
of this study and suggestions for further research are discussed. 
Keywords: framing, gain, loss, lie, dishonest behaviours, cheat, reward.  
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Introduction 
Do people lie to obtain a better outcome? Research has shown that giving people the 
opportunity to lie, results in dishonest behaviour (Ariely, 2012; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & 
De Dreu, 2011). People often overstate their outcome than the outcome they really acquired. 
Laboratory experiments that have been done, focussed on certain outcomes. These certain 
outcomes could be obtained by lying about or overstating one’s outcomes. This opportunity of 
lying to be sure of winning a certain amount of money leads again to obtaining a better 
outcome (Ariely, 2012; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011).  
 Previous studies aiming at dishonest behaviours or cheating have focused on certain 
rewards allocated by cheating behaviour. In these studies, a moral dilemma has been 
submitted to the participants. They must consider whether to be honest and earn a payment in 
accordance to their actual performance, or not to be honest and lie about their performance to 
gain a higher amount of money. Dishonest behaviours (i.e. overstating your performance), in 
these cases, lead automatically to higher rewards, comparing to honest behaviours, due to a 
certain and corresponding amount of money. A well-known paradigm that tests these 
dishonest behaviours under certain outcome situations is the die-under-cup paradigm 
(Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2011). In these studies participants roll a die 
privately and are being rewarded corresponding to the outcome they report, reporting 6 leads 
to a reward of €6, - and reporting a 1 lead to winning only €1, -.  Nobody, except for the 
participant obviously ever gets to know if the reported outcome is the true or an overstated 
outcome. This case, and being aware of the opportunity to lie, makes lying warrantable. 
Remarkable however, and slightly different from economic rationality: people are lying to a 
lesser extent than would predict. Moreover, they generally avoid major lies.  
 According to Ariely (2012) this phenomenon is caused by an ethical dilemma. On the 
one hand, increasing the possibility of one’s benefit is a way to serve one’s self-interest. 
However, on the other hand, people want to maintain their honest self-concept and 
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conscience. This discrepancy between enlarging one’s probability to win and serving one’s 
self-interest and on the other side conserve an honest self-concept often makes many people 
restricting their lying behaviour to an amount what feels legitimate for them, so they can still 
justify themselves. It seems to be the case that reporting a 5 after rolling a 2 is perceived as 
more legitimate than reporting a 6, because someone can maintain an honest self-concept by 
thinking not to have lied all the way, but just increased one’s chances of winning.   
 Increasing one’s chances to obtain a better outcome is also part of situations in 
everyday life. People are willing to lie or exaggerate a bit to increase the probability of 
benefits or better outcomes. For example, people are often overdrawing themselves in writing 
their CV or during job interviews to optimize the chance of getting applied for the job. In this 
case the dishonest behaviour could also be considered as unethical, but the consequences are 
uncertain, only optimized as much as possible.  
 
 
 
Dishonest behaviours in a probabilistic setting 
As stated above, most studies examining dishonest behaviours are focussing on certain 
outcomes. In many, if not most, everyday situations, a lie will not bring a certain outcome, but 
rather a lie increases the likelihood to get a desire outcome—for example, people may cheat 
on their CV to increase the chance to be invited for a job interview. What would be the effect 
of a lie that would influence an uncertain outcome instead of a certain outcome? In other 
words, when payoff is not a certain outcome anymore, but placed in a probabilistic setting? 
Would this probability of obtaining a better outcome also lead to more dishonest behaviours? 
Even when there remains a chance of not winning anything at all? In such a case, lying is not 
increasing the amount of money that could be received, but the probability of winning. The 
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current study is based on a previous master-thesis (Douma, 2017) that modified the die-under-
cup paradigm in a probabilistic setting. In this study, the outcome of the die-roll was 
corresponding with the chance of winning 6 Euros. This probability setting could be reached 
by picking a ball out of a box, a ball draw, which determines whether the participant would 
win the 6 Euros. The ‘winning’ balls would correspond with the number of eyes reported by 
the participants. The box initially contained 6 white, non-winning balls, which would be 
replaced by winning yellow balls, depending on the number of eyes reported. Thus, between 
one and six white (non-winning) balls would be replaced by yellow (winning) balls. In this 
way the die-under-cup paradigm is modified to a probabilistic setting. After replacing an 
amount of white balls into yellow balls, the participants were asked to randomly pick a ball 
out of the box. Picking a yellow ball results in winning 6 Euros, while picking a white ball 
leads to no payment. In this paradigm, reporting higher numbers, results in a higher chance of 
winning the money.  
The original version of the die-under-cup paradigm guarantees certainty in winning the 
amount of money reported. The probabilistic version, however, comprise two specific 
motivations, caused by the fact that winning the reward is not directly dependent on the 
reported number, what could be described as uncertainty avoidance and external attributions. 
In the probabilistic setting, the difference between reporting a six or a smaller number is large, 
because reporting six leads to a chance of 100% of winning the money. Reporting a six will 
thus remove any uncertainty. Human-beings are well known to avoid uncertainty, because 
they prefer control (Ladbury & Hinsz, 2009). This uncertainty avoidance should hence be a 
motive to people to report a six instead of lower numbers. In this case they know for sure that 
they will receive the desired outcome. Hypothesis 1: Due to uncertainty avoidance, people 
will over-report 6 (which removes the uncertainty).  
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In the original version of the dice-under-cup paradigm, the number reported is directly 
corresponding with the amount of money someone receives. To maintain an honest self-
concept, people are more willing to report a 5 instead of a 6, when they had rolled a low 
number (Shalvi et al., 2011). People want to justify their own lies in several ways (e.g. by 
reporting a 5 he/she had rolled in another, not counting, roll, or by considering that reporting a 
5 is more honest than reporting a 6). 
However, in the probabilistic setting, receiving the desired outcome has to do with the 
result of a random picked ball. Lying about the number of eyes of the rolled die is one step 
more remote from winning the desired outcome, what increases peoples willing to lie (Ariely, 
2012). Moreover, obtaining a positive result can in this case be considered as an external 
attribution to luck, because during the ball draw there was a chance of 5/6 of winning the 
desired outcome, instead of the internal knowledge of winning directly caused by one’s 
dishonest behaviour. Enlarging one’s chances to 80% of winning feels fairer than enlarging 
one’s chances to 100%. What would be cheating to the fullest. People prefer to attribute a 
positive outcome externally to luck, rather than admitting that they won, because of unethical 
behaviour (Shalvi et al., 2011). Thus, reporting a 6 is less attractive than reporting a lower 
number, because winning the desired outcome, cannot be externally attributed to luck after 
reporting a 6.   
Hypothesis 2: People will under-report a 6 (because it removes the possibility to 
attribute a desired outcome to luck) and over-report 5 and maybe 4 (as 5 and 4 enlarge the 
chance of winning the desired outcome, but could still leave the attribution to luck).  
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Gain and loss frames  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are contradicting to each other. According to uncertainty 
avoidance, people would over-report 6, while external attributions would lead to an under-
report of 6 and an over-report of 5 and 4. Both mechanisms might play a role, but the frame of 
the game decides which one will be dominant.  A well-known way of framing is the gain- 
versus loss-frame.  
According to the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), gains and losses 
are perceived differently. Winning or losing the same amount of money does not cause the 
same amount of arousal. People are more willing to avoid losses by taking more risks. On the 
other hand, are people more willing to play save and have a smaller gain, instead of taking 
more risk and be able to win more money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ladbury & Hinsz, 
2009). A loss has a bigger influence on people that an equivalent gain. Losing something 
causes more negative feelings than that gaining something causes positive feelings (Ariely, 
Huber & Wertenbroch, 2005; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2006; Zhang & Fishbach, 2005).  
There is not many research done on possible gains and losses influencing dishonest 
behaviour. But one relevant study provided by Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) proved that 
people react more sensitively toward a possible loss compared to a possible gain, due to loss 
aversion. Using the die-under-cup paradigm, based on the study of Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013), supported the predicted effect of framing: people show more dishonest 
behaviour to avoid a loss compared to approach an equivalent gain. If losses weight larger 
than gains, we would expect that the motivation to avoid uncertainty is particularly essential 
in the loss condition. We thus expect more support of Hypothesis 1 in the loss condition, 
compared to the gain condition. On the other hand, if people are more motivated to lie to 
avoid losses, they are less in need to attribute the results of their behaviour externally in a 
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gain-frame, so there is less need to lie and people prefer to keep their moral self-concept. We 
thus would expect that there is more support of Hypothesis 2 in the gain condition. 
Summarizing, we expect that framing influences cheating behaviour. Hypothesis 3a: In a 
loss-frame, people will over-report 6 (to remove uncertainty). Hypothesis 3b: In a gain-frame, 
people over-report 5 and maybe 4, and under-report 6 (because this removes the possibility to 
attribute the desired outcome to luck).   
 
Visibility versus no visibility 
As mentioned above, this current study is built on a previous master-thesis (Douma, 
2017), which has tested the same set of hypotheses described above. Results, however, did not 
support these hypotheses. Although the observed distributions in the gain frame condition 
showed a somewhat higher frequency of 4 and 5, and a lower frequency of 6, the distribution 
did not differ significantly from a uniform distribution. The distribution in the loss frame 
condition did not differ from a uniform distribution either, with the frequencies of reported 4, 
5 and 6 varying between 14.7% and 17%. Particularly the loss frame condition revealed the 
striking appearance of complete honest reports! Because of these unexpected findings, we 
decided to replicate this study and try to improve certain limitations Douma mentioned. An 
important factor that is possibly influencing the results is the fact that the reward of the study 
(i.e. money) was visible in the loss condition but was not in the gain condition. In this case the 
procedure was not exactly similar. We wonder what effect the visibility of money would have 
on cheating behaviour. According to Ariely (2012), people are more willing to lie, when there 
is more remote between dishonest behaviour and the reward. In our case we would expect that 
people would lie more when money is not visible (i.e. because the remote between lying and 
the reward is obviously bigger) than when money is visible. Due to a clear connection 
between the dishonest behaviour and the desired results dishonest behaviour is causing, 
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people are less willing to lie. On the other hand, when ones’ actions are more distant from the 
execution of the dishonest act, when they are suspended, and when people can more easily 
rationalize them, they find it easier to be dishonest (Ariely, 2012). 
 Another effect the visibility of money would have on cheating behaviour could be 
explained by Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar & Shehata (2009). A small remote between 
dishonest behaviours and the reward could also influence the amount of trust people expect 
the other person has in them. More trust correlates with more reciprocal behaviours, what 
could lead to less cheating. 
We decided to replicate the study with the first two conditions, designed the same as in 
the previous master thesis of Douma (2017). However, we planned to add one more condition 
to improve the possible limitation of an unequal procedure, a loss condition without the 
visibility of money, so this condition would be more comparable to the gain-frame condition. 
Furthermore, we added one more hypothesis to search for the effect of visibility of money. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be more dishonest behaviours in the loss-frame without visibility of 
money than in the loss-frame with visibility of money, due to the remote between the dishonest 
behaviour and the desired outcome.      
 
Method 
To test the predictions, a lab experiment will be conducted. The design of the 
experiment will be a between subject’s design. The lab experiment will consist of an edited 
version of the die-under-cup task (Shalvi et al., 2011) and two questionnaires. The description 
and details of the die-under-cup task and questionnaires could be found under the procedure 
paragraph.  
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Participants 
To conduct this study participants have been recruited at Leiden University. 
Recruitment has been done by a message on Sona, by using flyers and by recruiting people 
face to face. In total, 225 participants are recruited for this study and are equally divided into 
the three conditions of 75 people. Among these participants, there were 60 (26,9%) male and 
162 (72,6%) female participants. Two (0,4%) participants didn’t fill in their gender. 
Participants were between 17 and 59 years old (M=21.1, SD=4.04). Participants could earn a 
variable compensation, depending on the results of the die-under-cup experiment. The 
compensation would be either €0 or €6, plus course credit as show-up fee, independent of 
their results. Before taking part of the experiment, all participants must sign an informed 
consent. Furthermore, the protocol of this study has been approved by the ethical committee 
of Leiden University.  
 
Instruments 
For this study the following instruments are used. A form with the informed consent of 
the gain-frame (see Appendix 1), the informed consent of the loss-frames (see Appendix 2), 
In addition, one face validity questionnaire (see Appendix 3) that consisted of the ‘Work 
Locus of Control Scale’ (Spector, 1988) and the ‘FAD-plus’ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Before 
starting the experiment, this questionnaire was used to make the procedure less transparent 
and more credible. The next forms contained the instructions of the gain-frame (see Appendix 
4) and the loss-frames (see Appendix 5). Furthermore, a paper cup with a die inside that has 
been closed with paper on the upside and has a little hole someone could look through on the 
downside, as well as two corresponding versions of decision sheets, gain vs loss-frame (see 
Appendix 6), people could use to report the number they rolled. Moreover, six white and six 
yellow balls were needed and a box with a small hole (i.e. arm width) on the upside, so people 
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could blindly pick a ball out of the box without the ability to see and pick a ball. In addition, 
one additional questionnaire to measure the psychological constructs (see Appendix 7) is used 
to interpret differences between conditions, which is explained in the next section.  
 
Main research variables 
 Different psychological constructs have been measured in the two questionnaires we 
handed out during and after the experiment. The face validity questionnaire, as can be seen in 
Appendix A, contained 44 items about how participants attribute certain events in their lives. 
The first 16 questions formed the ‘Work locus of control scale’ (Spector, 1988), what 
measures to what extent people attribute work related events internally or externally (e.g. ‘If 
you know what you want out of a job, you can find a job that gives it to you’; ‘To make a lot 
of money you have to know the right people’). Participants indicated in what extent they 
agreed with the questions on a 6-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 6= strongly agree). 
Remaining items in the questionnaire based on the ‘FAD-plus’ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) 
formed the Determinism and Uncertainty scale. Items about determinism measure to what 
extent people attribute events in their lives to free will or to a cause external will. The items 
were scored on a 5-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree) (e.g., ‘Whatever will 
be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it’) the other part of the scale forms the 
uncertainty scale (e.g. ‘What happens to people is a matter of chance’). The reason to 
implement this questionnaire was as told before mainly to increase face validity, but also for 
exploratory reasons. It might be interesting to find out whether attributions are related to 
dishonest behaviours. Are people who believe in determinism for example more willing to 
play honest and people who believe in free will more willing to lie?   
Next to the first face validity questionnaire we also implemented a second 
questionnaire to measure psychological constructs after the experiment. This questionnaire 
13 
 
was not based on an already existing questionnaire, what means that the constructs have been 
formed by ourselves and tested on reliability. Different constructs have been measured. We 
assessed the construct ‘uncertainty avoidance’ with two questions: ‘Facing the uncertain 
outcome of the lottery was very unpleasant’ and ‘I felt uncomfortable not knowing whether I 
would draw a winning ball’. The reliability was good; Cronbach’s α = .80.  The next construct 
we measured was ‘trust’. We assessed this construct with the following five questions: ‘I felt 
that the experimenter trusted me’, ‘The behaviour of the experimenter showed me that she 
fully trusted me’, ‘I was convinced that the experiment would take place exactly as announced 
beforehand (i.e., in the informed consent and the instructions’, ‘I fully trusted the 
experimenter’ and ‘It was important that I behaved in a trustworthy manner’. The reliability of 
the construct was medium; Cronbach’s α = .72. The following construct ‘desire to win’ exist 
of the five questions: ‘I was hoping that I would roll a high number’, ‘I was hoping to replace 
as many non-winning balls by winning balls as possible’, ‘I felt that drawing a yellow 
(winning) ball would be very desirable’, ‘I felt that drawing a yellow (winning) ball would be 
very important’ and ‘Drawing a white (non-winning) ball would feel really bad’. The 
reliability of the scale was medium; Cronbach’s α= .67. The dishonesty construct consisted of 
four questions: ‘I thought about reporting a high number, even if I would roll a low number’, 
‘I felt that it was important to accurately report the number that I rolled’, ‘It was important to 
report my dice roll honestly’ and ‘I think that it is okay to report a higher number in this 
experiment’. The reliability was again medium; Cronbach’s α= .78. Perceived expected 
transparency of the experiment has been measured by the following two questions: ‘I knew 
that nobody would ever know which number I really rolled.’ and ‘I thought that the 
experimenter would know which number I really rolled’. Cronbach’s α= .67. The last 
construct ‘Post-experimental feelings’ has been measured with two questions: ‘I am happy’ 
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and ‘I am disappointed’, Cronbach’s α=.84, what can be considered as good. All implemented 
questions consist of a 9-point scale (1 = fully disagree, 9 = fully agree).  
 
 
Procedure 
The die-under-cup task that has been used in this study is a slightly edited version of 
the original one by Shalvi et al. (2011). In the original study, people received money 
corresponding to the number of eyes they reported. In our study we used a probabilistic 
setting by making people rolling the die first, replacing the white balls by yellow balls, 
corresponding by the reported number and ask them to draw a ball out of the box.  
To explore the differences on dishonest behaviours in different frames, three different 
conditions has been formed (i.e. gain-frame without visibility, loss-frame with visibility and 
loss-frame without visibility). Differences in procedure per condition are as follows. To start, 
in the gain-frame the participants will roll the die three times, but are asked to report the first 
roll. After they will pick a ball blindly out of a box. When the ball is yellow, they will receive 
the €6. There is no money visible in advance. In the loss-frame with visibility the participant 
will receive €6 is cash beforehand (i.e. this creates visibility of money), but are told that they 
could keep or lose it, depending on the result of the experiment. Next, they also roll a die 
three times and are asked to report the first roll. At last they will pick a ball blindly out of the 
box. When the picked ball is yellow they can keep their money in the envelop, but when the 
ball is white, they must hand in their received money. In the third condition, the loss condition 
without visibility of money, the participant is told that they own €6 now (what is not visible) 
and they can either keep it or lose it, depending on the results of the experiment. They will 
also roll a die three times and are asked to report the first roll. Finally, they will pick a ball 
blindly out of a box. Picking a yellow ball means that they really receive the €6, they are told 
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to possess beforehand. Picking a white ball means that they are told that they lost the €6 they 
possessed and receive nothing in the end. Except for the different procedures as described 
above, the rest of the procedure is similar for all conditions and could be described step by 
step as follows. 
The experiment had been conducted in the lab of Leiden University. At first, the 
participants were being welcomed in the lab by one of the experimenters. Before 
participating, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (i.e. 75 
participants were assigned to the gain-frame condition, 75 to the loss condition with visibility 
and 75 to the loss condition without visibility). They were asked to read the informed consent 
and sign it. The informed consent was already priming the gain or loss condition, by using the 
words ‘win’ vs ‘lose’. After signing, all participants were asked to fill in the first 
questionnaire, based on the ‘Work Locus of Control Scale’ (Spector, 1988) and the ‘FAD-
plus’ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). This questionnaire was meant to increase face validity. Next, 
participants got the instructions of the die-under-cup task (Shalvi et al., 2011). Participants in 
the gain-frame were again primed with ‘winning’ words in contrast to the two loss-conditions, 
in which ‘losing’ words were used. After reading the instructions, participants were asked to 
open the door to receive the next materials. In all conditions a cup with a hole in the top was 
used, so that the participant could only see what number he/she rolled. Participants shook the 
cup to roll the die and considered the hole to report the result. It was clear to the participants 
that they are the only person who knew what is rolled. To ensure this, the participants could 
roll the die an additional two times to make sure the die and procedure were fair. They 
however were asked to report the result of the first die roll. The next step was to let the 
experimenter replace the amount of white balls in the box by yellow balls, based on the 
reported number of eyes. The participants blindly drew a ball, what could be a yellow 
(winning) or a white (non-winning) ball. Depending on the ball draw, participants received €6 
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by drawing a yellow ball or €0 by drawing a white one. In de loss condition the participants 
were asked to hand in the money, in case of drawing a white ball. The second questionnaire, 
which measured several psychological constructs was the final part of the experiment. In total 
the experiment took around 20 minutes. The participants were allowed and invited to read a 
debriefing form after the experiment. 
 
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
To check whether participants noticed a perceived gain or loss condition, a 
manipulation check has been done. The different conditions are perceived differently F (2,65) 
= 5.78, p=.004.  The partial eta-squared (η2 = .07) was of medium size. Post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the gain condition (M =7.36, 
SD=.34) was significantly different from the loss condition with visibility of money (M = 
5.69, SD =.36) p=.003. People perceived a gain or a loss-cash condition with visibility of 
money differently. However, the loss condition without visibility of money (M = 6.44, SD = 
0.33) did not significantly differ from the gain condition, p=.131. This can be caused by the 
number of missing variables. 57 (25%) participants did not fill in the manipulation question.  
 
Non-parametric tests 
To test the hypotheses, a non-parametric test has been used. Considering the 
robustness of the test, checking assumptions beforehand is not necessary. The first hypothesis 
to be tested was:  
Hypothesis 1 
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To test Hypothesis 1, that due to uncertainty avoidance, people will over-report 6 
(which removes the uncertainty), I compared the observed frequencies of all dice outcomes to 
the uniform distribution (which should result if all participants would report honestly). 
Test results show that there is difference in reports in de total distribution Χ2(5, N = 
225) = 11.24, p = .047. To check the significant differences per condition, another non-
parametric test with separate conditions has been performed. The amount of reported numbers 
per condition can be seen in Table 1. The loss condition with visibility of money has called 
‘Loss-cash condition’ and the loss condition without visibility of money could be adopted as 
‘Loss-new condition’.   
 
Table 1. Test statistics of frequencies number of eyes reported 
Report  Gain  Loss-Cash Loss-New 
1 10 (13,3%) 6 (8,0%) 5 (6,7%) 
2 13 (17,3%) 12 (16,0%) 11 (14,7%) 
3 13 (17,3%) 14 (18,7%) 10 (13,3%) 
4 11 (14,7%) 17 (22,7%) 15 (20,0%) 
5 13 (17,3%) 14 (18,7%) 13 (17,3%) 
6 15 (20,0%) 12 (16,0%) 21 (28,0%)* 
* p < .05 
In all conditions the expected outcome per reported number of eyes is 12,5 (16,7%), 
this leads to an equal distribution. In the gain condition there is no significant difference 
found between numbers reported and the numbers expected Χ2(5, N = 75) = 1.24, p = .941 
neither in the loss-cash (with visibility of money) condition Χ2(5, N = 75) = 5.4, p = .369. 
However, in the loss-new (without visibility of money) condition there is prove of an 
overreport of 6. Due to significant results of the total distribution Χ2(5, N = 225) = 11.24, p = 
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.047 we can assume that 6 has been overreported, since the largest deviation can be found 
between the expected amount of reported 6 and the observed amount of 6. This means that 
Hypothesis 1 can be supported in a way that indeed the 6 has been significantly overreported 
in the total distribution.   
Hypothesis 2 
To test Hypothesis 2: People will under-report a 6 (because it removes the possibility 
to attribute a desired outcome to luck) and over-report 5 and maybe 4 (as 5 and 4 enlarge the 
chance of winning the desired outcome, but could still leave the attribution to luck), I 
compared the observed frequencies of all dice outcomes to the uniform distribution again.    
There is no evidence of under-reporting 6 or over-reporting 5 and 4 in the overall data, neither 
in one of the separate conditions. Hypothesis 2 must be rejected.  
Hypothesis 3a 
Testing Hypothesis 3a: In a loss-frame, people will over-report 6 (to remove uncertainty), an 
overall loss condition had to be computed. To find out if people over-report 6 in a general loss 
condition, the two loss conditions (loss-cash with visibility of money and loss-new without 
visibility of money) are taken together. In addition, I compared the observed frequencies of all 
dice outcomes in the combined loss condition. As can be seen in Table 2, we expected the 
numbers to be reported equally. 150 participants in the loss conditions divided by 6 possible 
outcomes gives an expected mean of 25 (16,7%) per reported number. To test Hypothesis 3a a 
non-parametric test has been performed. Test results show us that at least the largest 
deviation, the amount or reported ‘6’, differs significantly Χ2(5, N = 150) = 12.72, p = .026. 
This means that taken the loss-conditions together, at least a pattern of over-reported 6 can be 
found and proved, what concludes that Hypothesis 3a has been supported.  
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Table 2. Test statistics of frequencies number of eyes reported 
Report  Loss (Cash + New) 
1 11 (7,3%) 
2 23 (15,3%) 
3 24 (16,0%) 
4 32 (21,3%) 
5 27 (18,0%) 
6 33 (22,0%)* 
*p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 3b 
To test Hypothesis 3b: In a gain-frame, people over-report 5 and maybe 4, and under-
report 6 (because this removes the possibility to attribute the desired outcome to luck), the 
observed frequencies of all dice outcomes have been compared within the gain-frame. These 
frequencies form a uniform distribution, what concludes that there is no sign of an over-report 
of 5 and 4 or an under-report of 6, so no dishonest behaviours either. Hypothesis 3b had to be 
rejected.  
Hypothesis 4 
To test Hypothesis 4: There will be more dishonest behaviours in the loss-frame 
without visibility of money than in the loss-frame with visibility of money, due to the remote 
between the dishonest behaviour and the desired outcome, the observed frequencies of the 
two loss conditions have been compared, to find out if there can be found more reported 6’s in 
the loss-new condition without visibility of money than in the (original) loss-cash condition 
with visibility of money. The only condition that contains significantly different reports is the 
Loss-New condition, loss condition without visibility of money Χ2(5, N = 75) = 11.48, p = 
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.043. The largest deviation is a report of 21 times ‘6’, compared to an expected mean of 12,5 
(75 participants divided by 6 options to report). This largest deviation of an overreport of ‘6’ 
proves Hypothesis 4.  
Next to the results of the experiments, we also took the two questionnaires into account, 
to find out if there were differences in attributions of actions compared by different conditions. 
A correlation matrix is made (Table 3) to explore the results of the data collected from the first 
questionnaire based on ‘Work Locus of Control Scale’ (Spector, 1988) and the ‘FAD-plus’ 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Pearson Correlations are used for the interval variables: Locus of 
Control, Determinism, Uncertainty and the variable Report. Spearman Correlations have been 
used for the binary variables: Condition.  
As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 3), Locus of control is negatively 
correlated with Determinism r (204) = -0,230, p = 0,01. When people perceive control in their 
lives about events that happen they experience free choice and not that events happen, because 
they are meant to be.  
There is also a negative correlation found between Locus of control and Uncertainty 
r (212) = -0,227, p = 0,01. People who believe in keeping control about events in life also 
believe in diminishing uncertainty, because you are in charge about what is going to happen.  
Another positive correlation has been found between Trust and Uncertainty r (212) = 
.160, p = 0,02. The more people trusted the experimenter and tried to behave in a trustworthy 
manner themselves, what can be seen as reciprocal trust, the more they perceived the outcome 
as uncertain.  
The last correlation that has been found is a positive correlation between Locus of 
control and Condition r (215) = 0,215, p = 0,01. This one might be interesting, because although 
the scale of condition is nominal, a low score refers to a gain frame, whereas a high score refers 
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to one of the loss frames. We can assume that a high score on Condition (Loss-new without 
visibility of money) correlated with a perceived high Locus of control. People in the last 
condition feel more in charge about the outcomes of the game.  
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of questionnaire scales and reports 
 N M SD Locus of 
Control 
Determinism Uncertainty Trust Condition Report 
Locus of Control 216 4,07 ,35               - -,230** -,227** .003 ,215**    ,010 
Determinism 212 2,65 ,33 -.230** - .060 -.070 -.060   ,045 
Uncertainty 220 3,17 ,57 -,227**   .060 - ,160* -,087   ,109 
Trust 217 7,52 1,17 .003 -.070 ,160* - -.097 .129 
Condition 225 2,00 ,82 ,215**    -.060   -,087   -.097 -   -.060 
Report 225 3,84 1,63 ,010 ,045 ,109 .129 -.060 - 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of our research was to replicate the study of Douma (2017) which has tested 
most of the same set of hypotheses described in this study. The experiment of Douma, as well 
as this current study was set up to investigate if people are more willing to show dishonest 
behaviours in a probabilistic setting when they are placed in a loss frame, wherein they have 
to protect their possessions and increase their chances of winning maximally (by 
overreporting 6’s). And on the other hand, if people in a gain-frame are more willing to 
increase their chances of winning to a certain extent that they are still able to attribute the 
desired outcome to luck (by overreporting 4’s and 5’s and underreporting 6’s)? Results of the 
previous study, however, did not support these hypotheses. Although their observed 
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distributions in the gain frame condition showed a somewhat higher frequency of 4 and 5, and 
a lower frequency of 6, the distribution did not differ significantly from a uniform 
distribution. Particularly the loss condition revealed the striking appearance of complete 
honest reports. 
 Because of these unexpected findings, we replicated the study and added one extra 
condition (Loss-new, without visibility of money) to find out if visibility of money has a 
significant effect on dishonest behaviour. Most of our findings were equal to the findings of 
Douma (2017). We did not find any dishonest behaviour in the gain condition, neither in the 
loss-cash condition with visibility of money. However, our new and expanding condition, the 
Loss-new condition without visibility of cash showed significant results in dishonest 
behaviours. Significantly more 6’s are reported than other numbers. This was the only 
condition people lied significantly.  
Two questions have arisen, what makes our sample (in general) so honest and what 
causes the difference in dishonest behaviours between the two loss conditions. During the 
recruitment process, we aimed at recruiting first year psychology students. 34,7% of our 
participants had never done an experiment before, were new at university and did not know 
what to expect and what the consequences of dishonest behaviour were. Some of them let me 
know that they expected hidden cameras and punishments. That thought stimulated them to 
behave honestly. They also expected that we would definitely know what they actually rolled. 
This naivety of the participants might be an explanation of the degree of honestly. 
If we look at the results of the two loss-conditions, the effects are surprisingly 
different from each other. Psychological constructs that might be influencing the results are 
reciprocity and trust. If we look at the reciprocity perspective, we can take into account the 
theory of “mutually gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and services” (Gouldner,1960). 
When people receive services or gifts from another person, they often feel for doing 
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something in return too. It is about social norms and values that if someone does something 
good for you, you have to do good as well and cannot react with bad behaviour. The €6 
participants received in the loss-cash condition (with visibility of money) in cash can be 
perceived as a kind gesture of the experimenter. Receiving €6 in cash might enlarge the 
psychological construct of reciprocity and may stimulate to report your results honestly. 
Cheating might feel uncomfortable for the participants, because it undermines the 
psychological construct of reciprocity. This effect of reciprocity can explain the difference in 
dishonest behaviours between the loss-cash condition with visibility of money and the loss-
new condition without visibility of money as well. When people receive €6 in cash, the kind 
gesture of the experimenter is really clear, specific and tangible. This makes the perceived 
urge of reciprocity stronger, in a psychological way. People in the loss condition without 
visibility of cash, did not get anything tangible, what might create a less strong connection 
with the urge of acting reciprocally.    
According to Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) reciprocity is highly correlated with trust. If 
someone shows trust to the other person or that he or she can be trusted, interactions and 
behaviour between those people show more signs of reciprocity. Handing out the €6 in cash is 
a sign of trust from the experimenter to the participant. The participant notices the trust of the 
experimenter and in return might be more willing to show reciprocal behaviours and might be 
less willing lie. Another explanation of the difference in dishonest behaviours between the 
loss conditions could be explained by research Ariely (2012) as described in the introduction 
section. People are more willing to lie, when there is more remote between dishonest 
behaviour and the reward. In our case we indeed found that people lie more when money is 
not visible (i.e. because the remote between lying and the reward is obviously bigger) 
comparing to when money is visible. Due to a clear connection between behaviour and result, 
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people are less willing to lie. When the distance is big, people can more easily rationalize 
their behaviours, what makes it easier to lie (Ariely, 2012). 
Summarizing, the overall honesty of the participants can be a result of perceived 
reciprocity, social norms and trust. The naivety of the participants could also have an effect on 
the honest results of our research.  The difference findings in the two loss frames could be 
explained by the fact of a stronger effect of reciprocity and trust, due to the tangibility of the 
money handed out. People perceive less effect of reciprocity if they have not received 
anything real, what also has to do with the remote between behaviour and reward.  
 This research has replicated the study of Douma, 2017. It has again shown that people 
are more honest than expected. Results can be seen as a theoretical complement, because this 
study shows that people are more willing to show dishonest behaviours when they want to 
avoid a loss, but only when the perceived amount of reciprocity and trust is low.  
 
Suggestions for further research 
 This study contains a reward of €6. Further researchers should find out if the 
psychological connection to a reward of €6 is strong enough to lie for. Several students 
admitted that they initially participated for the credits and perceived the money just as an 
unnecessary bonus, and for that reason did not lie for it. The combination between earning 
credits and chance to go home with an additional €6 may decrease the urge to fight for the 
money.  
 Moreover, it is important to eliminate the experimenter bias. The experimenters should 
stay out of sight as much as possible.  
 Finally, to maximize the opportunity of lying, further researchers could consider 
giving the participants all freedom to manage the whole procedure themselves, including 
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drawing the ball, putting it back and reporting after all if they draw a yellow ball. In this way 
there are much more crucial moments available to lie. The participant will be more aware of 
the impossibility of being caught.  
Conclusion and implications  
This master thesis can be seen as a valuable replication of the study of Douma (2017), 
due to same findings in the original and similar conditions. On the other hand, can this thesis 
be perceived as ground-breaking and innovative. We can conclude that people are in general 
willing to play honest, but when they have to avoid a loss that is not visible and physically 
present, they lose sense of ‘the real deal’ and are more willing to play unfair. Conclusions of 
this master thesis are interesting to implement in business settings, for example when 
examining if handing out bonusses at the end of the year (gain frame) compared with cash 
bonusses in advance (loss frame cash, with visibility of money) or virtual bonusses in advance 
(loss new frame, without visibility of money) would lead to different declared working hours.   
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Appendix 1 Informed Consent Gain Frame 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you can win six Euro. Whether you win, will depend on a random ball draw. You 
will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white balls. If you draw a yellow ball, you win € 
6. If you draw a white ball, you win nothing. Before the ball draw you will first fill in a questionnaire.  
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated confidentially.  
You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please contact dr. W. Steinel, 
wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
Name Signature 
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Appendix 2 Informed Consent Loss Frame 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you get six Euro in cash. Whether you may keep this money, however, will 
depend on a random ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white 
balls. If you draw a yellow ball, you may keep the € 6. If you draw a white ball, you lose the money. 
Before the ball draw you will first fill in a questionnaire. 
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated confidentially. 
You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please contact dr. W. Steinel, 
wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
Name Signature 
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Appendix 3 Questionnaire 
 
Experiment: Uncertain Events  Participant number: _____________ 
Please give us the following information about yourself  
I am a      □ Man 
□ Woman 
□ Different  or  I don’t want to tell 
 
I am ________ years old. 
 
How often have you participated in similar experiments at the Faculty of Social Sciences? 
□ Never: This is my first time 
□ Once before: This is the second experiment i participate in 
□ Twice before: This is the third experiment i participate in 
□ Three times before: This is the fourth experiment i participate in 
□ I have been participating in more than three experiments before 
 
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly                     strongly 
disagree                         agree 
A job is what you make of it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
On most jobs, people can pretty much accomplish whatever they set out to 
accomplish. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
If you know what you want out of a job, you can find a job that gives it to 
you. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
If employees are unhappy with a decision made by their boss, they should 
do something about it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Getting the job you want is mostly a matter of luck. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Making money is primarily a matter of good fortune. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Most people are capable of doing their jobs well if they make the effort. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
In order to get a really good job you need to have family members or 
friends in high places. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Promotions are usually a matter of good fortune. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
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When it comes to landing a really good job, who you know is more 
important than what you know. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Promotions are given to employees who perform well on the job. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
To make a lot of money you have to know the right people. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
It takes a lot of luck to be an outstanding employee on most jobs. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
People who perform their jobs well generally get rewarded for it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Most employees have more influence on their supervisors than they think 
they do. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
The main difference between people who make a lot of money and people 
who make a little money is luck. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
Please turn over. 
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly                strongly 
disagree                    agree 
I believe that the future has already been determined by fate. 1     2     3     4     5 
People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality. 1     2     3     4     5 
Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. 1     2     3     4     5 
People have complete control over the decisions they make. 1     2     3     4     5 
No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. 1     2     3     4     5 
Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human 
behavior. 1     2     3     4     5 
No one can predict what will happen in this world. 1     2     3     4     5 
People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. 1     2     3     4     5 
Fate already has a plan for everyone. 1     2     3     4     5 
Your genes determine your future. 1     2     3     4     5 
Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. 1     2     3     4     5 
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. 1     2     3     4     5 
Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. 1     2     3     4     5 
Science has shown how your past environment created your current 
intelligence and personality. 1     2     3     4     5 
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People are unpredictable. 1     2     3     4     5 
Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do. 1     2     3     4     5 
Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives. 1     2     3     4     5 
As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. 1     2     3     4     5 
Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. 1     2     3     4     5 
Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. 1     2     3     4     5 
People have complete free will. 1     2     3     4     5 
Parents’ character will determine the character of their children. 1     2     3     4     5 
People are always at fault for their bad behavior. 1     2     3     4     5 
Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult. 1     2     3     4     5 
What happens to people is a matter of chance. 1     2     3     4     5 
Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. 1     2     3     4     5 
People’s futures cannot be predicted. 1     2     3     4     5 
 
When I am in conflict with someone else, the BEST outcome for me occurs when:  
□ I behave competitively and they behave cooperatively. □  
□ We both behave cooperatively. □  
 
When I am in conflict with someone else, the WORST outcome for me occurs when:  
□ I behave cooperatively and they behave competitively. □  
□ We both behave competitively. □  
Please open the door and wait for the experimenter! 
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Appendix 4 Instructions Gain Frame English and Dutch 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be anonymous. 
You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the experimenter during the 
experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any questions, 
open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
 
In this experiment, you can win a prize of €6. There will be 6 coloured balls, either white or yellow, 
which are placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which determines whether you win 
€6. If the ball you draw is yellow you win €6; if the ball you draw is white you win nothing. At the 
beginning of the experiment, there are 6 white balls in the bowl. The number of yellow balls that will 
replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you have 
an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. You must 
shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a look through 
the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice will determine the 
number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the decision sheet indicates the 
number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we ask 
that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the dice is 
legitimate.  
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will give you a 
"decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, tick on 
the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. Give 
the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as 
many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may 
randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you receive €6 and sign for receiving 
the money. If the ball you draw is white you will receive no money.  
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Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al je 
beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je beslissingen aan 
te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen van de proefleider. Er 
zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt kan 
je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
 
Tijdens dit experiment kan je €6 winnen. Er zullen 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak gestopt 
worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur deze heeft. Als 
de bal geel is win je €6; als de bal wit is win je niks. Aan het begin van het experiment zullen er 6 witte 
ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen hangt af van het aantal 
ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen.  
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone dobbelsteen 
met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In deze afdekking zit 
een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen schud je de beker om de 
beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je door het gaatje in de afdekking van 
de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen 
dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt 
voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat vervangen 
wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te gooien om voor jezelf 
vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider brengt je 
de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer hebt gegooid 
vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te kruisen. Je kunt de 
beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan de proefleider, zodat de 
proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, 
zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken.  
 
 
 
35 
 
Appendix 5 Instructions Loss Frame English and Dutch 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be anonymous. 
You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the experimenter during the 
experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any questions, 
open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
 
You just received €6 which is now yours. A ball draw will determine whether you lose this money. In 
this experiment 6 coloured balls, either white or yellow, will be placed into a bowl. You have to 
randomly draw one ball which determines whether you lose your €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you 
may keep your €6; if the ball you draw is white you lose your money and you need to hand in your €6. 
At the beginning of the experiment, there will be 6 white balls in the bowl. The number of yellow balls 
that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you have 
an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. You must 
shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a look through 
the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice will determine the 
number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the decision sheet indicates the 
number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we ask 
that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the dice is 
legitimate. Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will 
give you a "decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, 
tick on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. 
Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace 
as many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may 
randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you keep your €6 and sign for the 
money. If the ball you draw is white you will have to give your €6 to the experimenter. 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
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Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al je 
beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je beslissingen aan 
te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen van de proefleider. Er 
zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt kan 
je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
 
Je hebt zojuist €6 ontvangen wat nu van jou is. Je trekt zo een balletje, en daarvan hangt af of je dit 
geld verliest. Tijdens dit experiment zullen er 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak gestopt 
worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur deze heeft. Als 
de bal geel is mag je je €6 houden; als de bal wit is moet je je €6 inleveren. Aan het begin van het 
experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal 
vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen. 
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone dobbelsteen 
met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In deze afdekking zit 
een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen schud je de beker om de 
beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je door het gaatje in de afdekking van 
de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen 
dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt 
voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
 
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat vervangen 
wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te gooien om voor jezelf 
vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
 
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider brengt je 
de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer hebt gegooid 
vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te kruisen. Je kunt de 
beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan de proefleider, zodat de 
proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, 
zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken. 
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Appendix 6 Decision Sheet Gain and Loss 
 
Number 
displayed by the 
dice 
Number of 
yellow balls 
Number of 
white balls 
You win 
(if you draw a 
yellow ball) 
Tick the number 
rolled (X) 
Aantal ogen op 
de dobbelsteen 
Aantal gele 
ballen 
Aantal witte 
ballen 
Als je een gele 
bal pakt win je: 
Kruis het aantal 
ogen aan (X) 
 1 5 €6  
 2 4 €6  
 3 3 €6  
 4 2 €6  
 5 1 €6  
 6 0 €6  
 
Number 
displayed by 
the dice 
Number of 
yellow balls 
Number of 
white balls 
You will lose  
(if you draw a 
white ball) 
Tick the 
number rolled 
(X) 
Aantal ogen op 
de dobbelsteen 
Aantal gele 
ballen 
Aantal witte 
ballen 
Als je een witte 
bal pakt verlies 
je: 
Kruis het 
aantal ogen 
aan (X) 
 1 5 -€6  
 2 4 -€6  
 3 3 -€6  
 4 2 -€6  
 5 1 -€6  
 6 0 -€6  
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Appendix 7 Questionnaire Psychological constructs  
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Appendix 8 Debriefing form  
Thank you for participating in this study!  
 
The general purpose of this research is to investigate whether people report a different outcome of a 
dice roll than what they actually rolled when this behavior increases the likelihood to get a desired 
outcome (6 Euro cash), and whether this depends on framing (i.e., whether the ball draw is about 
winning 6 Euro or about not losing 6 Euro).  
In this study we recruited students at Leiden University who were randomly assigned to the loss frame 
condition and gain frame condition. You were asked to perform a different version of the dice under 
the cup paradigm. Specifically, you were asked to choose randomly a ball out of a container filled with 
six balls after rolling a regular six face dice. Firstly, the container was filled with six white balls. After 
the dice-roll, these balls were replaced with yellow balls depending on the report of the die roll. Every 
participant had to pick up randomly one ball from the container. In the gain frame condition the 
participant got the cash amount if he/she catch the yellow ball. If he/she catch the white ball, he/she 
did not receive the cash amount of six Euros. In the loss frame condition the participant got the cash 
amount before the dice roll. If he/ she catch the yellow ball, he/she could keep the money. If he/she 
catch the white ball, the had to turn the 6 euros back. 
In the loss-frame manipulation we expect that people will over-report 6 to fully remove the uncertainty 
and will under-report the outcomes below 6; in the gain-frame we expect that people will under-report 
6 because this remove the chance to attribute extrinsically the desired outcome to luck and over-
report 5 and maybe also 4.  
If you have further questions about the study, please ask the experimenter. You can also receive a 
research report; if you want this, please leave your email address on the reverse side of this form. If 
you have any complaints, you can contact dr. W. Steinel (wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl). 
You now have knowledge of relevant information concerning the research. We ask you to treat these 
information as confidential until the end of the study:  
 
 
Please do not talk about this study with other people, not to influence 
the behavior of future participants! Thank you! 
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Please send me a research report: 
Name Email address 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
